

**Memorandum for:**

The attached memo on Scandinavian nuclear-free zones and peace groups expands and codifies material EURA analysts discussed with the Vice President last week. It was forwarded to him via PDB staff.

21 June 1983

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## MEMORANDUM

Scandinavia: Nuclear Free Zone Proposals

Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone: First proposed by former Finnish President Kekkonen in 1963, it was re-introduced by him in 1978 and gained new support recently from Andropov. Although its proposed scope has varied over the years, in its most inclusive form it would keep nuclear weapons out of Soviet territory bordering on the region, out of the Baltic, and out of all Scandinavian countries, including the Faroes and Greenland.

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- Finland still supports the idea because it would reduce Soviet pretexts for intervening for "mutual" defense purposes.
- Palme sees it as a way to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange and keep nuclear-armed subs out of the Baltic.
- Norway and Denmark support the idea in theory but argue that it would be practical only in the context of broader disarmament; they cite the practical problems in ensuring compliance -- meaning Soviet compliance.
- Iceland supports the idea but thus far has not been included in the basic proposal. Sweden's Palme has suggested frequently that an invitation to join the zone be extended to Iceland.

In fact, Scandinavia is nuclear free already. Some Scandinavians thus see the proposal as a way of getting the Soviets to pull back their weapons adjacent to Scandinavia. However, the proposal would bar the introduction of US weapons in Norway and Denmark during a threat of hostilities.

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Central European Weapons Free Zone: Conceived by the Palme Commission, the concept became an official policy of the Swedish Government following Palme's return to the post of Prime Minister in September 1982. Last December, the Swedish Government sent a note to all NATO and Warsaw Pact members, plus Austria, Finland, Ireland, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia, describing the zone and asking for comment. The zone, devoid of all nuclear

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[redacted]

weapons, would be 300 km wide -- 150 km on each side of the boundaries of the blocs -- and would run from the "outermost northern to the outermost southern flanks of the two alliances."

- All NATO members except Greece responded negatively.
- Moscow reacted cautiously, then supported the idea if the zone would extend to 250 km to 300 km on each side of bloc boundaries, nearly blanketing West Germany and including all its INF sites.
- Egon Bahr of the SPD, who had helped Palme draw up the December note, rejected the Soviet idea.
- Palme is still pushing the idea as a useful "confidence building measure." [redacted]

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#### What is Wrong With the Zones?

[redacted] The major objections are verification problems and the constraints on NATO flexibility in the face of the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority. The mobility of tactical nuclear weapons and the inability to distinguish between most tactical nuclear and non-nuclear weapons make the suggestion impractical. Nuclear free zones offer a false sense of security, since nuclear weapons based outside the zones will still be targeted on countries in the zones. The deceptive attractiveness of the zone idea could also create public pressure on other allied governments to exclude nuclear weapons.

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## MEMORANDUM

Scandinavia: Peace Movements in the Region

Scandinavia's small, militarily vulnerable democracies are fertile ground for peace movements and anti-nuclear sentiment. The Soviets, usually through the Helsinki-based World Peace Council (WPC), try to exploit and direct the activities of peace groups but often in such a blatant manner that their efforts become counterproductive. Demonstrations occur less frequently than in West Germany and the United Kingdom, are usually smaller, and are non-violent.

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Denmark: The movement is broadly based but supported by leftist political parties. Danish Communists are active in the local umbrella organization affiliated with the WPC. The exposure of KGB funding of anti-nuclear advertisements that appeared in the press throughout 1981 has made Danes wary.

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Norway: A broadly based "No to Atomic Weapons" movement has gathered the signatures of one-eighth of the population on an anti-nuclear petition. Our Embassy believes this movement may be able to influence enough delegates that it could reverse the pro-INF balance in parliament by this fall. The Norwegian umbrella peace organization is not affiliated with WPC.

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Finland: The strongest Finnish peace movement from a political and organizational standpoint is the Communist-dominated Finnish Peace Defenders (FPD), a part of the WPC. The FPD promotes a strong anti-American line, and does not criticize the Soviets. The FPD and other smaller peace groups sponsored a disarmament demonstration in May, which the US Embassy described as peaceful and festive without much political content.

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Iceland: The peace issue is highly politicized here, with all parties engaged in the debate. The current government is pro-NATO; the opposition Peoples Alliance is anti-NATO. The Organization of Base Opponents, which has demonstrated in past years against US activity at the Keflavik NATO airbase, has lost momentum.

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Sweden: Supported largely by leftist and religious groups, the peace movement has a neutralist core. The WPC affiliate here has been so obviously pro-Soviet that Palme's Social Democrats joined with the labor movement in forming their own peace group.

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